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COMMENTS
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw - CoMMERCE CLAUSE - ScoPE OF FEDERAL POWER OVER INTRASTATE ACTIVITIES-FAIR LABOR STANDARDS
AcT - Authority of Congress to regulate intrastate activities through
the commerce clause is derived from two principal sources: (I) the
federal power to preserve the fl.ow of commerce by eliminating potential burdens and obstructions; ( 2) the federal power to prohibit the
interstate transportation of goods resulting in the spread of conditions
which Congress considers detrimental to the general welfare. Utilization of the first source of authority over intrastate activities is exemplified by the National Labor Relations Act,1 enabling the federal government to regulate an aspect of local production likely to burden commerce. Utilization of the second source of authority is exemplified by
the Fair Labor Standards Act,2 recently held constitutional in the case
of United States·v. Darby Lumber Co.8 The FLSA prohibits the interstate transportation of goods 4 produced by industries not complying
with the minimum wage and hour standard established for all employees "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce." 5 Since the Darby case indicates a more liberal interpretation of
the commerce power than hitherto announced, it warrants an examination of the scope of federal jurisdiction over intrastate activities under
the two theories of the commerce clause.
I.

A brief resume of the evolution of Congressional power over commerce may be helpful in appreciating this recent development. The
power to regulate interstate commerce was declared by the Supreme
Court in the Lottery Case 6 to include the power to prohibit absolutely
the interstate shipment of certain articles. The Court, in that decision,
announced in broad terms that the power over commerce was plenary,
subject only to the limitations found in the Constitution. Development
49 Stat. L. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), §§ 151-166.
52 Stat. L. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), §§ 201-219. On the
FLSA in general, see Cooper, "'Extra Time for Overtime' Now Law," 37 M1cH.
L. REv. 28 (1938); 39 CoL. L. REv. 818 (1939); 52 HARV. L. REV. 646 (1939).
8 (U.S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 451, reversing (D. C. Ga. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 734.
4 52 Stat. L. 1068, § 15 (a) (1) (1938), 29 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 215 (a)
( l). It also prohibits the interstate transportation of goods produced in violation of the
child labor provision, § 12. Although § 12 was not in issue in the Darby case, it was
automatically upheld when the wage and hour provisions were found valid.
5 52 Stat. L. 1062-1063, §§ 6, 7 (1938), 29 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), §§ 206,
207.
6 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 23 S. Ct. 321 (1903).
i
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of the federal power to prohibit commerce was advanced by judicial
approval of statutes prohibiting the interstate movement of articles
ranging from diseased cattle to misbranded foods. 7 In the broader field
of trade regulation, a virtual prohibition of the interstate transportation
of goods produced by illegal trusts was used to reinforce the Sherman
Act. 8 Apparently, Congress could determine what articles were fit for
distribution through interstate commerce, and could prescribe the conditions precedent to admissibility. But long before the limits of the commerce power as announced in the Lottery Case had been reached, the
Supreme Court temporarily stemmed its growth in Hammer v. Dagenhart,9 which declared unconstitutional a prohibition upon the interstate
shipment of goods produced with child labor. This case stated that the
power to prohibit interstate transportation extended only to articles
obnoxious in themselves, and that the Child Labor Act was in reality
a regulation of production, a local matter, rather than a regulation of
interstate commerce. While neither distinction was justified by the
language or logic of previous decisions,1° there was a difference between
the result of the Child Labor Act and the prior prohibitory legislation.
A statute which had the effect of requiring industries to employ individuals of certain age was a greater intrusion into the realm of state
affairs than one prohibiting the transportation of articles such as lottery
tickets or misbranded foods. It was not surprising that a court fearing
the encroachment of the federal government into state spheres should
establish the doctrine that the commerce power is limited by the effect
its exercise may have upon intrastate activities.11
Subsequent decisions undermined the significance of Hammer v.
1 Lottery tickets, Champion v. Ames, supra; diseased cattle, Reid v. Colorado, 187
U. S. 137, 23 S. Ct. 92 (1902); impure food, Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States,
220 U. S. 45, 31 S. Ct. 364 (19n); women enticed for immoral purposes, Hoke v.
United States, 227 U. S. 308, 33 S. Ct. 281 (1913), and Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U. S. 470, 37 S. Ct. 192 (1917); misbranded food, McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. II5, 33 S. Ct. 431 (1913); prizefight films, Weber v. Freed, 239
U. S. 325, 36 S. Ct. 131 (1915); intoxicating liquors violating laws of states of
destination, Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry., 242 U. S. 311, 37 S. Ct.
180 (1917).
8 26 Stat. L. 210, § 6 (1890), 15 U.S. C. (1934), § 6. Sec, 6 authorizes the
government to confiscate goods in interstate commerce produced by invalid trusts. The
main portion of the Sherman Act, prohibiting restraints of trade, can be classified as
a protection of the flow of commerce. A similar example is the commodities clause,
which prohibits railroads from hauling their own goods, upheld in United States v.
Delaware & H. Co., 213 U.S. 366, 29 S. Ct. 527 (1909).
9 247 U.S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529 (1918).
10 See Gordon, "The Child Labor Law Case," 32 HARV. L. REv. 45 (1918).
11 Infringement upon state activities was the principal reason why the lower
court decision in the Darby case declared the FLSA unconstitutional. United States v.
Darby Lumber Co., (D. C. Ga. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 734.
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Dagenhart. In Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. R.12
the Court sanctioned the attempt of Congress to prohibit the interstate
transportation of convict-made goods destined for states forbidding the
sale of such goods. The effect of the prohibition upon the states of production was not considered. Because the prohibition applied only to
shipments into states having related statutes, and not to shipments into
states permitting the sale of prison-made goods, the decision was not
a complete repudiation of Hammer v. Dagenhart. It also might be
distinguished on the ground that the effect upon intrastate activities
caused by prohibiting the interstate shipment of convict-made goods is
not as great as that resulting from prohibiting the interstate movement
of child-made goods.
An effort of Congress to regulate certain phases of production
through its power to preserve the flow of commerce was rebuked when
the National Industrial Recovery Act was declared unconstitutional in
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.13 The Supreme Court refused to accept the economic argument that the regulation of wages and
hours would raise prices and bring about prosperity, thus promoting
commerce. Again in Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 14 the Court failed to find
a relation between production and commerce, and ignored the contention that the regulation of wages and hours would prevent labor disputes which obstruct commerce. However, the regulation of at least
one aspect of production was recognized to be within the scope of the
commerce power in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.,15 upholding the NLRA. The Court there determined that the promotion of harmonious labor relations is a proper
means of preventing obstructions to commerce caused by strikes in ,
industries "affecting commerce."
12 299 U. S. 334, 57 S. Ct. 277 (1937). Hammer v. Dagenhart also was weakened by Electric Bond & Share Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 303 U. S.
419, 58 S. ,Ct. 678 (1938), sustaining the right of Congress to prohibit interstate
transactions of utilities which do not make certain disclosures. Other cases upholding
Congressional prohibitory legislation si~ce Hammer v. Dagenhart are: Brooks v. United
States, 267 U.S. 432, 45 S. Ct. 345 (1925) {stolen motor vehicles); Gooch v. United
States, 297 U. S. 124, 56 S. Ct. 395 (1936) (kidnapped persons).
18 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837 (1935).
14 298 U.S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855 (1936).
111 301 U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1937). Congressional power to protect the flow
of commerce also is the constitutional basis for fixing minimum milk prices for the
purchases of milk "in the current of interstate ••. commerce, or which directly burdens,
obstructs or affects interstate ... commerce." United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307
U. S. 533, 59 S. Ct. 993 (1939); 48 Stat. L. 34 (1933), as amended, 7 U. S. C.
(Supp. 1939), § 6o8b. See 39 M1cH. L. REv. 621 (1941). Both the power to protect commerce, and the power to prevent the spread of evil through commerce form
the constitutional basis for the regulation of tobacco quotas. Mulford v. Smith, 307
U.S. 38, 59 S. Ct. 648 (1939).
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Since the Jones & Laughlin case, the coverage of the NLRA has
undergone considerable expansion by interpretation. The Court, in that
case, emphasized the profound effect the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation had upon commerce because of its large size and its great
volume of interstate business. Subsequent decisions have minimized
this feature. The Court has expressly denied that the jurisdiction of
the NLRB depends upon the size of a particular industry, or the percentage of its business involved in interstate commerce.16 To regulate
the whole field of labor relations affecting commerce it is necessary
to regulate all of the small composite parts. Consequently, as presently
defined, the concept "affecting commerce" refers to the possibility that
labor relations as a whole may burden commerce, not that the labor
relations of any particular industry under the NLRA necessarily have
such an effect.
2.

United States v. Darby Lumber Co. presents further judicial recognition, in broader terms, that production is not a thing divorced from
commerce, and that it may be subject to regulation through Congressional control over interstate commerce. In reaching its decision, the
Court first establishes the constitutionality of section I 5 (a) (I) of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, which prohibits the interstate transportation
of goods produced in violation of the wage and hour provisions. Starting with the premise that the commerce power includes not only those
measures aiding, fostering and protecting commerce, but also those
prohibiting commerce, the Court repudiates the limitation of Hammer
v. Dagenhart which restricted the latter aspect of the power to articles
obnoxious in themselves. Rather, Congress "is free to exclude from the
16
Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 303 U. S.
453 at 567, 58 S. Ct. 656 (1938); National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 306
U. S. 601 at 606, 59 S. Ct. 668 (1939). Purely on the basis of the facts of the
NLRB cases it is possible to discover a judicial regard for the volume of an employer's
interstate commerce. Of the industries held by the Supreme Court to be under the
jurisdiction of the NLRB, the one with the lowest percentage (37%) of interstate
imports and exports, cumulatively, is a large canning factory, so it may have a substantial volume of interstate commerce even though such commerce may be a small
percentage of a large business. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, supra. The employers which are small in size in the NLRB cases have
a large percentage of their business in interstate commerce, so may have substantial
volume because of a high percentage of a small business. In National Labor Relations
Board v. Fainblatt the employer produced only one-half of one per cent of the men's
clothes in the country, but exported 80 per cent of his product, and imported most of
his raw materials. For a similar situation, note the facts in National Labor Relations
Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U. S. 58, 57 S. Ct. 615, 630,
645 (1937).
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commerce articles whose use in the states for which they are destined
it may conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals or welfare,
even though the state has not sought to regulate their use." 17 The
harm at which the FLSA is aimed is the economic coercion that forces
industries in one state to restrict wages and maintain hours in order to
compete with goods produced under inferior labor conditions in another
state.
While the Court expends considerable argument to show that the
incidental effect upon activities within states of destination furnishes no
grounds for invalidating the FLSA, it gives little attention to whether
the effect upon activities within the state of original producion affects
the validity of the act. The latter possibility is briefly dismissed in
overruling the thesis of Hammer v. Dagenhart by a statement that a
measure regulating intrastate affairs in either the state of destination or
the state of production is not unconstitutional if the regulation flows
from the supreme power of Congress to prevent the interstate distribution of articles injurious to the public welfare. Thus, the Court applies the broad language of the Lottery Case to its fullest extent in
upholding the FLSA.
The above portion of the opinion would have been sufficient to
sustain the fundamental principles of the FLSA. If Congress can prohibit the interstate transportation of goods produced under substandard
labor conditions, it certainly can announce the requisites of standard
labor conditions. But it was necessary expressly to uphold the wage and
hour provisions, sections 6 and 7, because one of the indictments in the
Darby case was for the separate violation of section 15 (a) (2), which
prohibits the contravention of sections 6 and 7. Furthermore, the provision enabling employees to sue employers for violation of the act 18
is based on sections 6 and 7, not on the prohibition of commerce clause.
Validity of the wage and hour provisions, according to the Court,
depends upon whether this factor of production so affects commerce as
to be within Congressional power. In finding that wages and hours do
so affect commerce, the concept "affecting commerce" is given a different meaning from that attributed to it in the NLRA cases. The
Court does not say the regulation of wages and hours is necessary to
protect the flow of commerce. It does not spell out the proposition that
just as poor labor relations may lead to strikes obstructing commerce,
inferior wages and hours may cause labor disputes which will burden
commerce; NLRB cases are cited merely as examples of how intrastate
activities may be regulated in the exercise of the commerce power.
17
18

United States v. Darby Lumber Co., (U. S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 451 at 457.
52 Stat. L. 1069, § 16 (b) (1938), 29 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 216 (b).
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The real basis for the constitutionality of the wage and hour provisions
as such is found in the Court's statement that,
"Congress, having by the present Act adopted the policy of
excluding from interstate commerce all goods produced for the
commerce which do not conform to the specified labor standards,'
it may choose the means reasonably adapted to the attainment of
the permitted end, even though they involve control of intrastate activities." 19
In other words, since Congress has power to prohibit interstate shipment of particular articles, it can proceed a step farther to regulate
directly their production before they reach the channels of commerce.20
The prohibitory provision is an exercise of the commerce power; therefore any measure which reasonably promotes the enforcement of that
provision necessarily affects commerce. This is more than an adoption
of Justice Holmes' dissent in Hammer v. Dagenhart, for his opinion
was predicated on the supposition that the Child Labor Act confined
itself to prohibiting the interstate transportation of certain goods and
did not propose directly to regulate production.
The Court states that it also believes the wage and hour provisions
can be sustained independently of the provision of the act prohibiting
commerce. The independent ground for the provisions is not the direct
prevention of obstruction to commerce, as in the NLRB cases. Instead,
the Court points out that the goods produced under substandard conditions in competition with goods produced under better conditions
will destroy or impair local businesses, causing a general dislocation of
commerce itself. Such a relation between commerce and production is
reminiscent of the indirect economic arguments rejected in several previous cases.21 An analogy is drawn between the purpose of the FLSA
and the object of the anti-trust acts to suppress unfair competition, the
difference lying only in the types of unfair competition suppressed by
the respective statutes. Low wages and long hours are considered
means of unfair competition, just as are rebates, false advertising _and
other practices. At most, this portion of the decision implies that there
are several constitutional bases for the wage and hour provisions, any
one of which is sufficient in itself to support them. It does not mean that
the provisions would be invalid if they could not be upheld entirely on
19

United States v. Darby Lumber Co., (U.S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 451 at 460.
The power to regulate wages and hours of employees who may be engaged in
the production of goods for both intrastate commerce and interstate commerce where
the two are inseparable is sustained on the basis of Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. I at 11,
59 S. Ct. 379 (1939), and cases there cited.
21
See notes 13 and 14, supra.
20
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the theory of the NLRA or the anti-trust acts.22 Nor does anything in
the decision indicate that the prohibition of commerce would be invalid
unless the wage and hour provisions could be independently upheld.
Stated briefly, the wage and hour provisions are sustainable as
necessary and proper supplements to the prohibition of the interstate
transportation of goods produced under substandard working conditions. The ability of Congress to restrain the interstate shipment of
such goods, in turn, is derived from the power to prohibit interstate
commerce for certain purposes. If validity of the wage and hours provisions depends at all on the "affecting commerce" concept, in the
sense of promoting or protecting the flow of commerce, the economic
effect on commerce of permitting the spread of goods produced under
substandard conditions is sufficient to bring wages and hours within
the scope of Congressional authority. Upon last analysis, the FLSA
may be regarded as a valid exercise of Congressional power to prevent
the channels of interstate commerce from being used as a medium for
spreading a condition or activity which Congress deems detrimental to
the general welfare. 23
The doctrine of the Darby case probably does not present an alternative constitutional basis for the NLRA. Conditions which Congress
can remedy on this theory are those capable of dissemination through
commerce. The evils of low wages and long hours are reflected in the
price of the product, and hence may be propagated by commerce. But
it is not so clear that unwholesome labor relations are reflected in
products shipped in commerce.24 If Congress in the future desires to
regulate a particular intrastate activity regulation of which is not necessary for a direct protection of commerce, the activity may nevertheless
be within Congressional power provided it results in a condition which
may be spread through interstate commerce to the detriment of other
states. The next logical step in expanding federal power is for the
Court to permit Congress to prohibit interstate commerce merely to
retard undesirable intrastate activities. While the shipment of certain
22 Once the Court has established the validity of prohibiting the interstate ship-ment of goods produced under substandard labor conditions, it would be rather anomalous to hold that a provision which amplifies the prohibition by enumerating standard
conditions is invalid unless there is some independent constitutional basis for it.
28 Since the wage and hour provisions can be upheld as supplements to the prohibition clause, they might be sustainable even in the absence of a prohibition of
commerce. Both the prohibition clause and the wage and hour provisions are methods
of accomplishing the main purpose of preventing commerce from being used to spread
an evil. If Congress chooses, it should be able to employ the latter method without also
utilizing the former.
24 Unless it is assumed that no collective bargaining, or unregulated collective bargaining, usually results in lower wages and longer hours, and hence lower prices.
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articles may not be detrimental to other states, the ability to market
them in interstate commerce helps keep alive the objectionable condition in the producing state. Congress might be able to eradicate this
stimulus,25 and directly regulate the intrastate activity as a supplementary measure.

3.
The broad interpretation of the commerce power utilized by the
Court in sustaining the FLSA is of importance principally as a guide
for future legislation. The actual coverage of the act probably is no
more inclusive than if it were upheld solely as a protection of commerce similar to the NLRA. The application of the FLSA does not
depend upon the size of an industry, or upon the percentage of its
products entering interstate commerce.26 But in view of the constant
expansion of the jurisdiction of the NLRB, it is very doubtful if the
application of the NLRA is restricted by size or percentage factors. An
industry of any size shipping any amount of goods into interstate commerce at fairly r~gular intervals is subject to both acts.21 Variations in
the coverage of the two statutes are due mostly to differences in their
wording. 28
Every employee in an industry shipping goods in commerce is
entitled to benefits under the FLSA unless he is not engaged in the
"production of goods for commerce." 29 In view of the act's liberal
25 Under this interpretation of the commerce clause the NLRA could definitely
be brought within the theory of the Darby case, if the statute were worded appropriately. It might also permit the federal government to prescribe safety devices for
industries producing goods for commerce, the lack of which do not necessarily result
in lower prices, capable of being spread in commerce, as do inferior wages and hours.
26
United States v. Darby Lumber Co., (U.S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 451 at 461.
27 Preventing the spread of evil through interstate commerce is merely the general
basis for the constitutionality of the FLSA, and undoubtedly will not be used as a
factor in determining whether a particular industry is under the act. A producer operating under substandard working conditions who ships in interstate commerce could not
avoid the act by showing that he is not spreading the evil because his product sells in
other states at a price as high as the price of similar goods produced in the states of
destination. The Court precludes the possibility of having seriously to consider such
a contention by mentioning several grounds for sustaining the FLSA.
28
The constitutional phrase of the FLSA is "employees • • • engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce." 52 Stat. L. 1062 (1938), 29
U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 206. The constitutional phrase of the NLRB is "to prevent
any person from engaging in any unfair labor practices affecting commerce." 49 Stat.
L. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 160 (a).
29
lnterpretative Bulletin No. I, § 3, WAGE AND HouR MANUAL 130 (1940).
Whether goods are produced for interstate commerce depends upon the intent of
the producer at the time of production, and is unchanged by subsequent events.
Interpretative Bulletin No. 5, § 2, WAGE AND HouR MANUAL I 3 I ( I 940).

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

definition of a person engaged in the production of goods to include
a person "in ... any manner working on such goods, or in any process
or occupation necessary to the production thereof, in any state," 80 the
possibility of such an exclusion is practically hypothetical. 81 The
NLRA in prohibiting the engaging in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce may, nevertheless, be broader than the FLSA in certain
situations. A company which conducts two distinct businesses, one intrastate and the other interstate, may have its intrastate business subject
to the NLRA because labor disturbances in it would have repercussions
in the interstate business a:ffecting commerce. Employees of the intrastate business would not be engaged in an occupation necessary for the
production of goods by the interstate business, and therefore would not
be under the FLSA. 82
Because of the inclusive definition of a person engaged in the
production of goods for commerce, it is claimed that the FLSA applies
to an industry sending no goods into commerce, directly or indirectly,
but whose activities are necessary for production in another industry
which does ship in commerce. 88 Thus an employee subjects his employer to the FLSA when the employee is engaged in an occupation
necessary for the production of goods for commerce although the goods
actually entering interstate commerce are produced by another company. Since the former production also affects commerce, the industry
probably is under the NLRA.84
A manufacturing or processing plant importing raw materials from
so 52 Stat. L. 1061, § 3 (j) (1935), 29 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 203 (j).
81 See Interpretative Bulletin No. 1, § 5, WAGE AND HouR MANUAL 130 (1940),
which claims that the maintenance of an employee on the payroll is proof that he is
necessary for the production of the goods. The producer has the burden of proving
that a particular employee is not engaged in the production of goods for commerce.
82 In Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C. C. A.
4th, 1940) n5 F. (2d) 414, a utility engaged in distributing gas locally, operating
a local streetcar and bus line, and distributing electricity interstate, was held to be
under the jurisdiction of the NLRB as to the first two activities as well as the last
because of the repercussions a labor dispute in the former might cause in the latter.
It is quite probable that the gas, bus, and streetcar employees are not under the FLSA
because their occupation is in no way necessary for the interstate distribution of the
electricity.
88 Interpretative Bulletin No. 5, § n, WAGE AND HouR MANUAL 135 (1940).
The FLSA includes tool and die concerns which sell their products within the state
for use by producers of goods for commerce. See 4 W. H. R. 73 (1941) where the
Wage and Hour Division ruled that employees engaged in the installation of oil tanks
sold to oil companies within the state are under the FLSA when the tanks will be used
to store oil, some of which will be shipped in interstate commerce.
84 Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197,
59 S. Ct. 206 (1938); Consumers Power Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
(C. C. A. 6th, 1940) n3 F. (2d) 38.
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other states, but selling entirely to consumers within the state, probably
must comply with the NLRA.35 A strike at the receiving end would
obstruct commerce as much as one at the producing end. Such an industry, however, is not under the FLSA because it has no employees engaged in the production of goods for commerce. 36 While a company
importing goods from other states and selling intrastate is not "engaged
in the production of goods for commerce," it may be "engaged in commerce" and consequently subject to the FLSA. This includes intrastate
wholesalers importing merchandise from other states because the goods
are in the stream of commerce as long as they are in the original
packages.87
An employer does not escape application of the FLSA or NLRA by
selling his goods within the state when it is known that the vendee or
some subsequent vendee will ship them out of the state.38 The problem
of tracing the goods is more difficult, however, when they are sold
within the state to another industry where they are combined with other
goods to create a finished product, or are substantially changed in form
before being exported. Since the FLSA defines "goods" as any part or
ingredient,39 it is contended that the first producer is subject to the
FLSA/0 No NLRB case has gone quite that far,4' 1 but if the courts
trace the goods into their combined or altered form in applying the
FLSA, it seems likely that the production of the component parts
would be deemed to be "affecting commerce."
A detailed speculation as to the coverage of the FLSA 42 is not
vv arranted by the Darby case, but in view of the unrestrained manner
in which the Court upheld the FLSA, the liberal interpretations issued
by the Administrator of the FLSA 43 probably will be sustained. At
least, a producer who reasonably contemplates that any of his goods in
85 The case. closest approaching this fact situation is National Labor Relations
Board v. A. S. Abell Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) 97 F. (2d) 951, in which a newspaper imported most of its materials, but shipped only 7 per cent of its circulation into
interstate commerce.
86 Interpretative Bulletin No. 5, § IO, \VAGE AND HouR MANUAL 135 (1940).
37 Interpretative Bulletin No. 5, §§ 14, 15, WAGE AND HouR MANUAL 136
(1940). For the problem of the wholesaler-retailer, see id. 137.
38 lnterpretative Bulletin No. 5, § 4, WAGE AND HouR MANUAL 132 (1940).
89 52 Stat. L. 1060, § 3 (i) (1938), 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 203 (i).
40 Interpretative Bulletin No. 5, §§ 5, 6, WAGE AND HouR MANUAL 132 (1940).
41 In National Labor Relations Board v. Idaho-Maryland Mines Corp., (C. C. A.
9th, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 129, the NLRA was held not to apply to a California mine
selling ore to the United States, which processed the metal and shipped it out of the
state.
42 For other speculations as to the coverage of the FLSA see, 52 HARV. L. REv.
646 at 650 (1939); 39 CoL. L. REv. 818 at 828 (1939).
43 See WAGE AND HouR MANUAL 125-151 (1940).
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the usual course of business will enter the channels of interstate commerce is unwise to question the applicability of the act to any of his
employees unless he can show that they had nothing whatever to do
with the production of the goods for commerce, or unless the producer
comes within one of the statutory exceptions.44

44

For a discussion of statutory exemptions, see

276 (1940).
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